In this paper, we analyze the security of two recently proposed distance bounding protocols called the "Hitomi" and the "NUS" protocols. Our results show that the claimed security of both protocols has been overestimated. Namely, we show that the Hitomi protocol is susceptible to a full secret key disclosure attack which not only results in violating the privacy of the protocol but also can be exploited for further attacks such as impersonation, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. Our results also demonstrates that the probability of success in a distance fraud attack against the NUS protocol can be increased up to ( 3 4 ) n and even slightly more, if the adversary is furnished with some computational capabilities.
Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is widely being deployed today in many applications which require security, such as payment and access control applications. Although many solutions have been proposed to secure RFID systems, most of them are still susceptible to different attacks related to location such as: distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. All of these attacks aim at suggesting a wrong assumption of the distance between a tag and a reader. In distance fraud attack, a tag operates from out of the range where it is supposed to be. Mafia fraud attack, is a kind of man-in-the-middle attack in which a rogue tag circumvents the security mechanisms by getting right answers from the legitimate tag via a rogue reader, while both legitimate entities (legitimate reader and tag) remain unaware. In the terrorist attack, a legitimate tag colludes with the adversary, giving her the necessary information to access the system by impersonating it for a limited number of times. The described attacks require simpler technical resources than tampering or cryptanalysis, and they cannot be prevented by ordinary security protocols that operate in the high layers of the protocol stack. The main countermeasure against these attacks is the use of distance bounding protocols, which verify not only that the tag knows the cryptographic secret, but also that is within a certain distance. To achieve this goal, distance bounding protocols must be tightly integrated into the physical layer [1] . In 1993, Brands and Chaum proposed the first distance bounding protocol [5] . Afterward, in 2005, Hancke and Kuhn [6] proposed the first distance-bounding protocol dedicated to RFID systems. This protocol has the drawback of giving the adversary this chance to succeed with the probability of ( 
n in distance and mafia fraud attacks, where n is a security parameter. Since then, there have been many solutions proposed either similar to Hancke and Kuhn [2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12] or with different structures [5, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15] . However, they mostly have something in common; they all consist of three phases, the first and the last ones called slow phases, and the second one called the fast phase. The round trip time (RTT) of a bitwise challenge and response is measured n times during the fast phase to estimate the distance, while the slow phases include all the time-consuming operations. Recently, two distance bounding protocols have been proposed by Lopez et al and Gürel et al called Hitomi [4] and Non-Uniform Stepping (NUS) [15] distance bounding protocols respectively. These protocols are claimed to provide privacy and resistance against distance, mafia and terrorist fraud attacks. Our Contribution. In this paper, we apply a key disclosure attack to the Hitomi protocol and a distance fraud attack on the NUS protocol. Our analysis is framed in the formal framework introduced in [16] . Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a succinct description of the framework we do our security analysis within. In Sections 3, we describe the Hitomi protocol, its security claims and our key disclosure attack on it. In Section 4, we explain the NUS protocol and explain our distance fraud attack against it, and finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
To lend clarity to our work, we do our security analysis on the two target distance bounding protocols within the formal framework which has been introduced by Avoine et al in [16] . To do so, we dedicate this section to briefly explain this framework and define the terms and models, we will utilize later.
Attack Types
There are four types of typical attacks to distance bounding protocols in the literature.
-Impersonation Fraud : Given a distance bounding protocol, an impersonation fraud is an attack where a lonely tag purports to be another one. -Distance Fraud : Given a distance bounding protocol, a distance fraud is an attack where a dishonest and lonely tag purports to be in the neighborhood of the reader. -Mafia Fraud : A mafia fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a distance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle between the reader and an honest tag located outside the neighborhood.
-Terrorist Fraud : A terrorist fraud is an attack where an adversary defeats a distance bounding protocol using a man-in-the-middle between the reader and a dishonest tag located outside of the neighborhood, such that the latter actively helps the adversary to maximize her attack success probability, without giving to her any advantage for future attacks.
Adversarial Modeling

Adversary Model
The adversary model which has been used in the framework is the Dolev-Yao model [18] . In this model, the adversary can provoke or manipulate the communication between two parties where manipulating the communication means relay, withhold, or insert messages and she is only limited by the constraints of the cryptographic methods used. However, she cannot perform unbounded computations and cannot obtain the keys of honest parties. The latter assumption is not considered for the distance fraud attacks, where the tag has access to the keys.
Adversary's Location
In the distance fraud attack, depending on how far the adversary is from the reader, she receives the challenges with some delay. This delay may impact the probability of success of the attack. Considering this determining factor, we use a modified version of the model described in [3] . In this model, the adversary can communicate with the reader from one of the spherical zones illustrated in Figure 1 . For instance, Z 0 represents the legal authentication region with the diameter d 0 , where the adversary accesses to all the challenges and produces valid responses on time. The distance d 0 is calculated as:
where, c is the propagation speed of light, t p is the one-way propagation time, ∆t is the total elapsed RTT and t d is the processing delay of the tag. When the adversary is located at Z l , any response from her takes more time to get to the reader, namely
In order to have a successful attack, the adversary should send each current response, at least 2δ t before receiving the current challenge. Moreover, the adversary located in Z l has access to the challenges up to l th previous round before she generates the response of the current round.
Tag Model
Considering that whether the tag has full control on the execution of the algorithm or not, we can have two different tampering capability models for the tag, black-box and white-box. -Black-box model : In a black-box model, the tag cannot observe or tamper with the execution of the algorithm. -White-box model : In a white-box model, the tag has full access to the implementation of the algorithm and a complete control over the execution environment.
Notations
Here, we explain the notations used hereafter.
-x: Secret key of the tag.
-f x (.): Pseudo-Random Function operation with secret key x.
-hw(.): Hamming Weight calculation function.
-N R , N T : Random numbers generated by the reader and the tag respectively.
-n: The length of registers considered as a security parameter.
Assumptions
The protocols described in this paper are executed under following assumptions:
-The tag and the reader share a long-term secret key x.
-Each tag has a unique identifier ID.
-The tag's capabilities supports a Pseudo-Random Function (f ) and can perform bitwise operations. -The reader and the tag agree on:
• a security parameter n.
• a public pseudo random function f with length of n bits.
• a timing bound t max • a fault tolerance threshold τ .
3 The Hitomi Protocol
Description
As stated in Section 1, being a distance bounding protocol, the Hitomi protocol ( Figure 2 ) consists of three phases, two slow phases which are carried out at the first and final part of the protocol called preparation phase and final phase respectively. And the fast phase which is executed in between, called rapid bit exchange phase.
In the preparation phase, the reader chooses a random nonce (N R ) and transmits it to the tag. In return, the tag chooses three random numbers N T1 , N T2 and N T3 and computes two temporary keys (k 1 and k 2 ) as (3) and (4).
where W and W represent two constant parameters. By using these keys, the tag splits its permanent secret key x into two shares as response registers(i.e. R 0 = k 1 and R 1 = k 2 ⊕x). Finally, the tag transmits the 3-tuple {N T1 , N T2 , N T3 } to the reader. The rapid bit exchange phase is a challenge and response phase with n rounds. In its i th round, the reader generates a random challenge bit c i and sends it to the tag while initializing a clock to zero. The tag receives c i which may not be equal to c i due to errors or alterations in the channel. Immediately upon receiving c i , the tag responses with r i = R ci i . The reader stops the clock after receiving r i , which may not be equal to r i due to errors or alterations in the channel, and computes the round trip time (RTT) of this challenge and response transaction and stores it as ∆t i . The final phase starts with computing and sending two following messages from the tag to the reader.
Finally, the reader computes three kinds of errors and checks whether their summation is below a fault tolerance threshold as following.
-errc: the number of times that c i = c i .
-errr: the number of times that c i = c i but r i = R ci i . -errt: the number of times that c i = c i but the response delay ∆t i is more than a timing bound threshold t max (∆t i > t max ).
If the reader authentication is also demanded, the reader computes
and transmits it to the tag. Once the tag checks its correctness, the two entities are mutually authenticated. The authors claim that the Hitomi protocol provides mutual authentication between the tag and the reader and also guarantees privacy protection. The authors argue that the success probability of the mafia and distance fraud attacks against their scheme is bounded by ( 
Key Disclosure Attack
In this section, we present an attacking scenario to the Hitomi protocol which leads to tag's secret key disclosure. Our main assumption in this attack is that the reader authentication is not demanded and so the protocol is executed without the optional message t A . This allows an unauthorized reader(adversary) to query the tag several times without being detected.
Algorithm 1 portrays how an adversary, modeled in Section 2.2, is able to extract ∆ bits of the tag's secret key by querying the tag m times. The algorithm starts with the preparation phase in which at mth run, the adversary first generates a new random number N R , sends it to the tag and receives the 3-tuple of {N T1 , N T2 , N T3 } in return.
The rapid bit exchange phase of the algorithm starts with generation of a challenge vector by the adversary which contains ∆ bits of 1 and n − ∆ bits of 0 (c (m) ). By sending the bits of this challenge vector to the tag in n rounds of the rapid bit exchange phase and receiving the responses, the adversary obtains n − ∆ bits of R 0 = k 1 and ∆ bits of R 1 = k 2 ⊕ x. We know that if the adversary is able to find k 1 , she will be able to calculate k 2 by (4). Now, the adversary requires to search over all possible 2 ∆ values for k 1 .
If we observe the output of
T3 , W ) in the mth run of the protocol for 2 ∆ times, each time with one different possible value of k 1 , we will see that the number of values for the first ∆ bits of k 2 (k 2(1) , ..., k 2(∆) ) is less than 2
∆ . This can be calculated by a well-known problem in probability theory described in Remark 1. Each k 2 nominates one X ∆ = (x (1) , ..., x (∆) ) for ∆ bits of the tag's secret key (Line 16 of the Algorithm 1). So, each time the adversary queries the tag, she will obtain a set of potential candidates for X ∆ . If she continues querying the tag, each time she will obtain a set of different candidates. These candidates can be removed from the list by further querying, unless they are nominated in the other runs. And the final candidate is the one which has been in the candidate list in all the queries. The number of times that the adversary must query the tag to be left with only one candidate is calculated by (9) and plotted in Figures 3 and 4 . Remark 1. Consider the process of tossing b balls into b bins. The tosses are uniformly at random and independent of each other. The probability of not falling any ball into a particular bin can be calculated by (7) [17] .
Pr(one particular bin remains empty) =
Hence, the probability that a ball does not remain empty is simply p 1 = 1 − p 0 . Due to independency, if we repeat the same experiment for m trials, the probability that one particular bin remains empty at least in one of m trials is 1 − p m 1 . Now, we can calculate the probability that all bins experience to be empty at least in one of m trials (P r(Success)) by (8) . Receive
send the challenges to the tag in n rounds and receive the responses. 11:
(n) ) 13:
CandidateF lag(l) ← 1 21:
end if 22:
end for 23:
for j = 1 to 2 ∆ do 24:
if counter(j) = m then 25:
N umberof Candidates ← N umberof Candidates + 1 26:
F inalCandidate ← j 27: end if 28:
end for 29:
m ← m + 1 30: until N umberof Candidates = 1 31: (x (1) , ..., x (∆) ) ← Decimal2Binary(F inalCandidate) 32: return m, (x (1) , ..., x (∆) ) * Decimal2Binary(.) outputs the binary representation of a given decimal number. ** Binary2Decimal(.) outputs the decimal representation of a given binary number.
For our problem it is only required to substitute b with 2 ∆ and we will have: Figure 3 illustrates the probability of success calculated in (9) 32, which should be chosen according to computational constraints. So far, we have accomplished to find the first ∆ bits of the tag's secret key with a certain probability. In a similar vein, one can find other bits of the secret key by choosing a different challenge vector (e.g. for finding (x (∆+1) , ..., x (2∆) ) the challenge should be chosen like (10) and the above algorithm should be executed another time).
In this way, the adversary accomplishes to find the whole tag's secret key, if she can query the tag for enough times. Figure 4 illustrates the number of runs of the protocol which an adversary must query the tag and its probability of success to find the entirety of tags's secret key, assuming that her computational capability is limited to 2 ∆ = 2 16 computations. The computations include: searching over 2 ∆ values of k 1 , finding k 2 for each k 1 and candidate one X ∆ . The graphs have been plotted for four different key sizes n = 32, 64, 80 and 128. For instance, the adversary is required to query the tag about 70, 140, 175 and 280 times to find the tag's secret keys of size 32, 64, 80 and 128 bits with the probability of about 0.9 respectively. It is obvious that having this attack accomplished, the adversary is able to easily either track or impersonate the tag in further interrogations. The information elicited in this attack also paves the way for performing other attacks such as mafia or terrorist fraud attacks.
The NUS Protocol
Description
The NUS protocol ( Figure 5 ) also consists of three phases, two slow phases a fast called rapid bit exchange phase.
In the first slow phase, the reader chooses a random nonce(N R ) and transmits it to the tag. In return, the tag chooses another random number(N T ) and computes the response register R = f x (N R , N T ), which is of length 2n. The tag then initializes the variables j1, j2, k1 and k2 to 1, n, 0 and 2n + 1 respectively and sends back N T to the reader. In the i th round of the rapid bit exchange phase, the reader generates a random challenge bit c i and sends it to the tag while initializing a clock to zero. The tag receives c i which may not be equal to c i due to errors or alterations in the channel. Immediately upon receiving c i , the tag sends the bit r i , computed according to the procedure shown in Figure 5 . The final phase concludes with sending the message m which consists of all challenges the tag has received, from the tag to the reader and finally, the error computation which is almost the same as in the Hitomi protocol. The authors claim that the success probability of the distance, mafia and terrorist fraud attacks against the NUS protocol is bounded by ( 1 2 ) n .
Distance fraud attack
In this section, we present a distance fraud attack on the NUS protocol in two different tag models, a black-box and a white-box. The main assumption we have is that the adversary is located at zone Z 1 , i.e. at the i th round of the rapid bit exchange phase, the adversary accesses to the value of the challenge bit in previous round c i−1 , before generating current response r i . This assumption implies that the adversary is able to update the registers j1, j2, k1 and k2 and she is aware of their correct current values, before she generates the response.
Black-Box Model
The probability of success for the distance fraud attack in this model can be calculated by (11) . P dis = P r(Success|x j1 x j2 = 00)P r(x j1 x j2 = 00) + P r(Success|x j1 x j2 = 01)P r(x j1 x j2 = 01) + P r(Success|x j1 x j2 = 10)P r(x j1 x j2 = 10) + P r(Success|x j1 x j2 = 11)P r(x j1 x j2 = 11)
If x j1 x j2 = 00 and without knowing c i , the adversary should anticipate the right response(r i ) between R k1+1 and R k2−1 . Let us define the probability of equality of these two bits by (12) .
So, we have, P r(Success|x j1 x j2 = 00) = P r(Success|x j1 x j2 = 00, R k1+1 = R k2−1 )(P eq ) + P r(Success|x j1 x j2 = 00, R k1+1 = R k2−1 )(1 − P eq ) If R k1+1 = R k2−1 , the adversary can simply outputs either of these two bits and succeeds with the probability 1. Otherwise, she outputs a random bit and she will have the success probability of 1 2 . So, P r(Success|x j1 x j2 = 00) = 1 × P eq + 1 2
We can do similar calculations for other three possibilities of x j1 x j2 . Since all four possibilities of x j1 x j2 are equally likely, we have the probability of success for a distance fraud attack in one round as (14) .
In a similar vein, one can show that due to independency of the n rounds, the adversary obtains the success probability of ( 1+Peq 2 ) n for n rounds. If we assume that zeros and ones are equally likely, P eq equals to 1 2 and for n rounds we have:
White-Box Model Our main assumptions in this attack are as following. We assume that, there is a 1-second latency between the preparation and rapid bit exchange phases of the protocol. It implies that the adversary can run the pseudo-random function f for c times between the preparation and the rapid bit exchange phases, where c the number of a simple random number function like a hash function that can be computed per second on a single PC [16] . In [16] , Avoine et al has presented an instance of a distance fraud attack against a white-box-modeled tag in Hancke and Kuhn protocol. They have devoted the white-box modeled tag's capabilities to minimize the hamming weight difference of n-bit response registers in the Hancke and Kuhn protocol(hw(R 0 ⊕R 1 )). They have proved that if P i = P r(success|(hw(R 0 ⊕ R 1 ) = i)), the probability of success in the distance fraud attack can be calculated by (16) .
In order to utilize (16) for our purpose, we define P i = P r(Success|hw(R) = i). This implies that, we devote the tag's capability to minimize the hamming weight of the response register R in the NUS protocol. Having this in mind and by using (14), we can calculate P i for n rounds as following.
As the response register R in the NUS protocol is of length 2n, we only need to substitute n by 2n and P i by (17) in (16) . Table 1 compares the claimed security of the NUS protocol and our results in black and white box models in terms of the probability of success of an adversary in the distance fraud attack. For example, for n = 32, the probability of success in the distance fraud attack in a black-box model is 1.0045×10 −4 . This probability improves to 0.0035 in a white-box model for c = 2 23 which roughly represents the number of hashes that can be computed today per second on a single PC [16] . These probabilities are remarkably beyond the claimed security ( Table 1 . Comparison of the probability of success for distance fraud attack against the NUS protocol for c = 2 23 ≈ 10 6 .
Conclusions
The design of a secure distance bounding protocol which can resist against the existing attacks for RFID systems is still challenging. Despite of interesting proposals in the literature, this field still lacks a concrete solution. Recently, two solutions have been proposed for this purpose called the Hitomi and the NUS distance bounding protocols. We presented a secret key disclosure attack on the former and a distance fraud attack on the latter protocol. Our results showed that the security margins which was expected to be yielded by them have been overestimated. We showed that the Hitomi protocol is vulnerable to a full secret key disclosure attack by querying the tag several times. In addition, the probaility of success in a distance fraud attack against the NUS protocol was shown to be able to be increased up to (
